UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/174
8 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. In its resolution 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, the General Assembly took note of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission 1/ and requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ together with all the official records of the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session relating to disarmament matters.

2. Pursuant to that request, the relevant documentation is listed below:

(a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1992 session; 2/

(b) Reports of the Conference on Disarmament in pursuance of General Assembly decision 47/422; 3/

(c) Verbatim records of the plenary meetings of the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session regarding the general debate on and consideration of disarmament matters (A/47/PV.4-30, 81, 88 and 98);

(d) Verbatim records of the First Committee meetings at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly regarding disarmament matters (A/C.1/47/PV.3-37);

(e) Reports of the First Committee to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on the consideration of the disarmament items on the agenda (A/47/679-693 and Add.1, 694-700, containing also lists of documents submitted in connection with those items.

3. All of the above documentation has already been circulated.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh session, Supplement No. 42 (A/47/42).

2/ Ibid, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27).

3/ A/C.1/47/14, annexes I and II.

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/175
19 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 6

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER RELATED FIELDS

Working paper submitted by Cuba

1. The 1992 meeting of the Disarmament Commission included an item in its programme of work entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", and it was decided to establish a Working Group which would be entrusted with that item.

2. The Working Group agreed to consider the following four questions, identified as the substantive aspects of the item:

(a) Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security;

(b) Science and technology for disarmament;

(c) The role of science and technology in other related fields;

(d) The transfer of high technology with military applications.

3. In order to facilitate their consideration, the ideas, suggestions and proposals submitted by Cuba on this item are set out below in accordance with the Working Group's decision to subdivide the item into the four aspects listed in paragraph 2.

(i) Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security.

Disarmament and arms control agreements should place greater emphasis on the qualitative aspects of the arms race, in order to prevent the improvement of

the various types of armaments, in particular, weapons of mass destruction, which is aimed at increasing their destructive power.

The application of science and technology for legitimate defence purposes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is a right of all States.

The imposition of any sort of blockade against a country for political reasons which is designed to prevent that country from having access to scientific and technological advances of an exclusively peaceful nature should be prohibited, unless it has been approved by the international community.

The use of scientific and technological advances to extend the arms race into outer space should be prohibited.

Measures should be adopted to promote the use of scientific and technological advances for exclusively peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the economic development of all States, in particular the developing countries.

To this end, it may be appropriate to adopt a set of norms or guidelines to safeguard the exclusively peaceful use of scientific and technological advances and of those which could be dual-purpose.

Countries with resources and installations devoted to scientific and technological research for military purposes should adopt measures of a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral nature to limit the scope of such research, with a view to preventing the further acceleration of the qualitative arms race.

Measures should be adopted to guarantee a more equitable and fair distribution of state-of-the art scientific and technological advances and to ensure that the developing countries have adequate access to these advances.

The possibility should be explored of adopting a code of conduct for scientists and specialists engaged in research work with a dual application, with a view to ensuring that such research work serves peaceful purposes only.

Efforts should be made to promote the right of all States to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological advances for peaceful purposes, without prejudice to sovereignty or national security.

Agreements should be adopted on the search for greater transparency and openness in the development of research which could have a dual application, so as to ensure the peaceful use of its results, especially in the areas of nuclear, space and computer technology, and, at the same time, to safeguard information related to national security which has no direct connection with the obligations entered into.

(ii) Science and technology for disarmament.

The exchange of information on aspects related to the application of the development of science and technology for disarmament should be promoted, either through the organization of international meetings and events or through the preparation of documents and reports, in order to improve the existing methods

used to carry out the various verification activities envisaged in the agreements on disarmament and arms limitation or reduction.

(iii) The role of science and technology in other related fields.

Unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures should be adopted to ensure that scientific and technological advances are applied without damage to the environment and without causing environmental pollution.

(iv) The transfer of high technology with military applications.

In Cuba's view, universally acceptable international norms or guidelines should be established to regulate international transfers of sensitive technologies, while ensuring at the same time that those norms do not deny access to high technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes.

Furthermore, measures should be adopted to promote the process of transparency and greater openness in carrying out research which may have dual applications, in order to ensure the peaceful use of its results.

At the same time, effective and verifiable measures should be adopted to prevent dangerous scientific and technological advances in areas of research and development which may be used to produce certain types of weapons, as in the case of biological weapons, or at the stage of production, as in the case of chemical weapons.

The draft guidelines submitted by Argentina and Brazil on this subject may serve as a basis for the adoption of the international norms mentioned above.

However, Cuba believes that the following ideas should be included in an updated version of these guidelines:

(1) The technologies and sensitive services that will be subject to international regulation should be identified, and the corresponding multilateral agreements covering these technologies should be adopted.

Each such agreement should include an appropriate mechanism to update the list that is approved.

(2) A register should be established in the United Nations in order to monitor and update this type of technology and the corresponding services and to receive information on future trends in the development of dual-use science and technology and on the obligations which may be assumed to guarantee their exclusively peaceful use.

One aspect which should be taken into account when preparing the final report on the Disarmament Commission's consideration of this topic is the role of the United Nations in this sphere.

The United Nations is an appropriate forum for the multilateral consideration of this issue, and measures should be adopted to promote international events and meetings on this subject.

In order to lay the groundwork for a multilateral approach to international transfers of sensitive technology products, services and know-how, the United Nations should establish and keep up to date the fullest possible register of restrictions or limitations established by States in this field, including laws, regulations and other relevant national provisions that are in force.

One of the most important measures that could be adopted at the international level and should be promoted by the United Nations is the conversion of all military research and development activities carried out by Member States to peaceful purposes for the benefit of the economic and social development of all countries.

In order to achieve greater transparency in this field, it might be useful for the United Nations to provide advice to Member States on establishing groups of experts with the basic objective of carrying out an analysis of this topic.

UNITED
NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/176
19 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 6

ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER RELATED FIELDS

The transfer of high technology with military applications

Working paper submitted by Brazil and Canada

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 45/61 of 4 December 1990, 46/38 D of 6 December 1991, and 47/44 of 9 December 1992,

Recalling that Member States were invited to widen multilateral dialogue bearing in mind the proposal for seeking universally acceptable international norms and guidelines that would regulate international transfers of high technology with military applications,

Recognizing that norms or guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account legitimate requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that they do not deny access to high technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes,

The Disarmament Commission agrees on the following guidelines and recommendations regarding the transfer of high technology with military applications:

1. Science and technology per se are deemed to be neutral and their application for peaceful purposes should be promoted. International transfers of high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are essential for the economic and social welfare of all nations.

2. The application of science and technology for legitimate defence purposes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is a right of all States. Measures taken by Member States in exercising this right must meet the requirements of international law.

3. Multilateral dialogue is required to promote international cooperation in the transfer for peaceful purposes of high technology with military applications. Such dialogue should aim at strengthening confidence among States, promoting their social and economic development and contributing to broadly acceptable international arrangements in this field.

4. The application of science and technology relevant to conventional weapons should not lead to quantitative or qualitative arms build-ups which threaten international peace and security.

5. Commitment to, and fulfilment of, comprehensive and balanced international non-proliferation norms are essential to the maintenance of international peace and security and provide the basis for the promotion of international cooperation in the transfer of high technology potentially relevant to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

6. Bearing in mind the legitimate security needs of States, every effort should be made to devote scientific and technological resources to economic and social development and the welfare of the international community rather than to military purposes.

7. The application of science and technology for disarmament purposes should be promoted, inter alia, in the fields of weapons disposal, military conversion and the negotiation and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements.

8. International cooperation in the application of science and technology for disarmament purposes should be strengthened and, in this regard, access to disarmament-related technologies should be facilitated.

9. International non-proliferation arrangements and agreements are strengthened by their widespread acceptability. It is therefore desirable to secure the adherence of the greatest possible number of States both on the sides of supply and of demand to such arrangements and agreements.

10. The effectiveness of such international arrangements is enhanced by clearly defined rights and obligations, operational transparency, adequate verification and the commitment on the part of both suppliers and recipients to cooperate to the maximum extent possible in order to ensure that transfers for exclusively peaceful purposes will not be diverted to non-peaceful uses.

UNITED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/177
22 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 6

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER RELATED FIELDS

Working paper submitted by Australia

Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security

1. The development and dissemination of scientific understanding and technology, and their applications, can enhance international confidence and security through their contributions to development or through their role in arms control.

2. Science and technology applications in the military sphere can also generate tension between nations, by inference of a threatening intent, by making weapons harder to detect and destroy, by leading to more indiscriminate weapons, by consuming increasing financial resources (which in turn stimulates the pressure for arms sales) and by generating competition for weapons capabilities.

3. In some cases, transparency in weapons capability can be confidence-building, and to that extent States are encouraged to share information on developments in science and technology in the military sphere.

Science and technology for disarmament

4. The negotiation of arms control agreements should be supported by an understanding of relevant science and technology, and experts therefore have a particular contribution to make to such negotiations.

5. The development of, and cooperation in attaining access to, science and technology applicable to environmentally sound weapons disposal, conversion of military assets to civilian uses and the verification of implementation of arms control agreements, is a high priority.

The role of science and technology in other related fields

6. Science and technology can contribute to sustainable economic and social development. Underdevelopment is a source of international insecurity.

7. Therefore, the acquisition of science and technology for peaceful development purposes should be encouraged. States should cooperate in the dissemination of science and technology.

8. In the development of science and technology for military purposes, States should direct resources particularly towards science and technology which can also have civilian uses. As appropriate, and in accordance with normal commercial practice, they should share information about the possible civilian applications of military-related science and technology.

The transfer of (high) technology with military applications

9. States have a right to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. They are permitted to use science and technology for the purposes of such self-defence.

10. Caution should be exercised in the transfer of science and technology which can be used for offensive purposes or where its acquisition will generate or contribute to international insecurity. The development or enhancement of international cooperation to address the transfer of science and technology in such circumstances should be promoted.

11. States should adhere to and abide by the international instruments which govern the acquisition or transfer of science and technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

12. International transparency in the transfer of science and technology relevant to military purposes, and in the operation of export control regimes, should be encouraged.

UNITED NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/178
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 4

PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Working paper submitted by Australia

One form of consensus document that the Working Group might consider is a two-section paper - one section dealing with the generic principles on nuclear disarmament (including commitments to non-proliferation) and a more specific section which contains recommendations on collateral nuclear items such as negative security assurances, comprehensive test ban, cut-off, nuclear-free zones and other measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It may be preferable to include general rather than detailed references to these areas, avoiding controversial aspects, thus heightening the chances of achieving consensus.

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UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/179
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda items 4 and 5

PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Letter dated 22 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

I have the honour to refer to the Disarmament Commission's provisional agenda for the 1993 substantive session, which has been circulated as document A/CN.10/L.32 dated 14 April 1993.

With specific reference to items 4 and 5 of the provisional agenda, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a speech delivered by the State President of South Africa, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, to a joint session of Parliament on 24 March 1993, announcing developments relating to South Africa's nuclear capability and accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I should be grateful if the text of this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

SPEECH BY THE STATE PRESIDENT, MR. F. W. DE KLERK, TO
A JOINT SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, 24 MARCH 1993

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

When I decided last week to call a joint session, it was my intention to concentrate on the announcement to Parliament of important information with regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related matters. Since then certain developments have compelled me to cover a much wider area. I am, however, still commencing with announcements relating to South Africa's nuclear capability.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related matters

Members will recall that when I delivered my first opening address on 2 February 1990, I emphasized, among other things, the normalization of South Africa's international relations. An important aspect of this was, and is, the significant contribution that South Africa can and will have to make towards peace, stability and progress in southern Africa. With this objective in mind the Government has - in addition to many other initiatives in a variety of other spheres - taken far-reaching and drastic decisions with regard to the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. This includes nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The Government acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991. We became a founder signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction on 14 January 1993. It is also participating in the current review of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons.

I wish to concentrate today on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and would like to convey important information to Parliament, the public and the international community. It is important that the integrity of the Republic of South Africa with regard to its commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be placed above any doubt.

When a country accedes to the NPT, it undertakes, as from the date of accession, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It also undertakes to enter into a Safeguards Agreement, in terms of which a comprehensive inventory of all the nuclear material and nuclear facilities as they exist for the country as a whole at the time that agreement enters into force, be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such facilities and material are then subject to international inspection and verification. The IAEA also conducts regular inspections to verify the inventory and to ensure that these materials and facilities are used for peaceful purposes only.

Since its accession to the NPT, South Africa has strictly adhered to the conditions of the NPT and has maintained a policy of transparency and professional cooperation with the IAEA. This positive approach has led to South

Africa's resuming its seat at the IAEA General Conference, since September 1991, without opposition, after an absence of 12 years.

The process of verifying the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear materials and facilities has proceeded so successfully that the IAEA was in the position to report to the Board of Governors in September 1992, after a large number of IAEA inspections, that nothing had been found to suggest that South Africa's inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was not complete, nor was there anything to suggest that the list of facilities and materials submitted for controls was incomplete.

However, mainly because of the events in Iraq, which violated the conditions of the NPT by launching a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, certain countries have called the effectiveness of the IAEA verification regime into question. Some countries have also alleged that South Africa still has covert aspirations in this regard and that it has not fully disclosed its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Such allegations are regularly taken up by both the local and the international press, and are beginning to take on the dimensions of a campaign. South Africa's present nuclear programme which is directed towards commercialization, including the export of high-technology products, is in the process placed under suspicion and is harmed. Our country cannot afford this. Accordingly, I wish today to confirm unequivocally that South Africa is adhering strictly to the requirements of the NPT and that it will continue to do so.

I would, however, like to go further. Any doubt about the Government's intentions with regard to nuclear matters must, for once and all, be removed. For this reason, the Government has decided to provide full information on South Africa's past nuclear programme despite the fact that the NPT does not require this.

At one stage, South Africa did, indeed, develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability.

The decision to develop this limited capability was taken as early as 1974, against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in southern Africa, as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact members.

The build-up of the Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary - as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked.

Details relating to the limited deterrent capability, and the strategy in this regard, which were at that time developed, are as follows:

- The objective was the provision of seven nuclear fission devices, which was considered the minimum for testing purposes and for the maintenance thereafter of credible deterrent capability;

- When the decision was taken to terminate the programme, only six devices had been completed;

- No advanced nuclear explosives, such as thermonuclear explosives, were manufactured;

- The programme was under the direct control of the Head of Government, who decided that it should be managed and implemented by Armscor;

- Knowledge of the existence of the programme was limited to a number of Ministers on a "need-to-know" basis;

- The strategy was that, if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major Powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene;

- It was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence.

This was the situation when I became State President in 1989. As a former Minister of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), I was also informed about this.

On my assumption of office as State President it was already evident to me, and also to my colleagues who were also informed, that it was in our national interest that a total reverse - also in respect of our nuclear policy - was called for.

During 1989, the global political situation changed dramatically:

- A cease-fire in Angola was agreed;

- On 22 December 1988, a tripartite agreement was signed at the United Nations with Cuba and Angola which provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola;

- The cold war had come to an end and developments leading to the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet bloc had become the order of the day;

- The prospects of moving away from a confrontational relationship with the international community in general and with our neighbours in Africa, in particular, to one of cooperation and development were good.

In these circumstances a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous, but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations.

World opinion had also become increasingly opposed to nuclear weapons, and significant advantages for South Africa could be forthcoming should it accede to the NPT. Although it already had an advanced nuclear technology base and

nuclear industry, accession would facilitate the international exchanges of the new technology for its future development. It could also be of benefit to our neighbouring States and in due course to Africa as a whole.

Within this factual framework, and with consideration to all of the other innovative policy objectives which by then had already begun to take on form, it was decided towards the end of 1989 that the pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba should be closed and decommissioned.

Early in 1990, final effect was given to decisions that:

- All the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed;

- All the nuclear material in Armscor's possession be recast and returned to the AEC where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures;

- Armscor's facilities should be decontaminated and be used only for non-nuclear commercial purposes;

- After which South Africa should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards.

The implementation of these decisions and instructions proceeded according to plan. The process of dismantling took place under the strict, joint control of the AEC and Armscor. As a further control measure, an eminent professor of nuclear physics, Professor W. L. Mouton, was appointed as independent auditor to oversee the process. It was his task to satisfy himself that every gram of nuclear material had been accounted for and all the hardware and design information was destroyed. This has been done.

South Africa acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 10 July 1991 and signed, according to the requirements of the Treaty, a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 16 September 1991 with immediate force and effect.

On 30 October 1991, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, South Africa submitted a complete inventory of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction which contained such materials on 30 September 1991, since which date all such materials and facilities are subject to international safeguards.

South Africa's hands are clean and we are concealing nothing. Permission has now been granted by the Government, with a view to international inspection, for full access to facilities and records of facilities, which in the past were used for the preparation of a nuclear deterrent capability.

I sincerely trust that this unprecedented act, namely the voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability, and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information will confirm this Government's effort to assure transparency. I trust also that South Africa's initiative will inspire other countries to take the same steps.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another country in this regard. Our expertise, technology and nuclear materials were fully protected and dealt with strictly according to international standards and agreements. South Africa has never conducted a clandestine nuclear test.

There may be a perception that the decision to abandon the programme means that the investment in the whole enterprise had been wasted. This is not the case.

The enrichment technology developed by the AEC, as well as the nuclear materials which were produced, constitute an important asset for South Africa. They will contribute significantly to the ultimate success of the AEC's peaceful commercialization programme.

The operation of the pilot enrichment plant allowed South Africa to continue operation of the AEC's research reactor, which is also used for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes, during a period when the international community refused to provide nuclear fuel for its operation.

The nuclear material that was used for the devices has been recovered and will be used to enlarge the production of these and other isotopes. SAFARI-I is amongst the very few reactors which can meet this need.

Furthermore, the application of the enrichment technology to the establishment of the semi-commercial enrichment plant provided South Africa with the ability to provide all the nuclear fuel requirements of the Koeberg nuclear power station, and to guarantee this supply at a time when the delivery of nuclear fuel for Koeberg from overseas was denied.

In addition to this, South Africa's accession to the NPT has already led to the lifting of nuclear sanctions by the United States of America. Exchanges of visits with States in Africa have also taken place with a view to agreements on the use of medical isotopes and training programmes. We have become a member of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA), an organization within the IAEA which coordinates peaceful nuclear projects and cooperation between African States in the nuclear field.

The prospects for further cooperation will be enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa. The Government has already publicly committed itself to this, and believes that it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of peace and security in southern Africa.

South Africa will soon be taking an active part in the transcontinental discussions on this all-important issue. We will be supported by the fact that South Africa acquired a nuclear capability, and, in recognition of its new relationship with Africa and the broader international community, abandoned it.

Without accession to the NPT none of this would have been possible. I trust that the book on this chapter of the past can now be closed, and that a new one of international cooperation and trust can now be opened.

Press release No. 13/93, 24 March 1993
Issued by the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations
New York
24 March 1993

Enquiries: Mr. Costa Ayiotis, Second Secretary, tel. (212) 692-2469

UNITED
NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/180
4 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 4

PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation

The conclusion of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was a real step forward in the field of nuclear disarmament and a major achievement of 1993. The Russian-American declaration adopted on 4 April 1993 in Vancouver confirmed that Russia and the United States are moving resolutely towards the earliest possible entry into force of the SALT I Treaty and ratification of SALT II. These agreements, which greatly reduce the level of nuclear danger, open real possibilities for involving other nuclear Powers in this process.

In the next two years these efforts could be directed essentially to elaborating a package of agreements which would ensure a total and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. In this connection to begin as soon as possible preferably in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, multilateral consultations or talks on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account the special role which the five nuclear Powers play in this area.

Among the priorities of multilateral disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament, Russia attaches particular importance to the clear and consistent implementation of the agreements that have already been concluded.

In this context, implementation of agreements in the sphere of nuclear disarmament in the territory of the former USSR is of great importance, through the speediest possible accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan and of Ukraine, and also the other States of the Commonwealth of Independent States which have not yet taken the corresponding steps, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear States. Russia strictly observes these Treaties and is prepared to assist the parties concerned in the implementation of the obligations undertaken by them pursuant to these agreements.

As we draw closer to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is scheduled for 1995, the international community must mobilize its efforts to the maximum degree with a view to strengthening the regime of this Treaty. The forthcoming Conference can be an important stage in conferring on the Treaty a global and permanent character.

UNITED
NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/180*
5 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda item 4

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In the next two years these efforts could be directed essentially to elaborating a package of agreements which would ensure a total and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. In this connection to begin as soon as possible preferably in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, multilateral consultations or talks on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account the special role which the five nuclear Powers play in this area.

Among the priorities of multilateral disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament, Russia attaches particular importance to the strict and consistent implementation of the agreements that have already been concluded.

In this context, it is important that the agreements in the sphere of nuclear disarmament should be implemented in the territory of the former USSR,

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

and that the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as the other States of the Commonwealth of Independent States which have not yet taken the necessary steps, should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear States at the earliest possible date. Russia strictly observes these Treaties and is prepared to assist the parties concerned in the implementation of the obligations undertaken by them pursuant to these agreements.

As we draw closer to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which is scheduled for 1995, the international community must mobilize its efforts to the maximum degree with a view to strengthening the regime of this Treaty. The forthcoming Conference can be an important stage in conferring on the Treaty a global and permanent character.

UNITED
NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/CN.10/181
5 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1993 substantive session
New York, 19 April-10 May 1993
Agenda items 4 and 5

PROCESS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REGIONAL APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Letter dated 22 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

I have the honour to refer to the Disarmament Commission's provisional agenda for the 1993 substantive session which has been circulated as document A/CN.10/L.32 dated 14 April 1993.

With specific reference to items No. 4 and 5 of the provisional agenda, entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" and "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", I wish to bring to your attention a number of developments in South Africa both in regard to nuclear weapons and in regard to disarmament in general.

South African President F. W. de Klerk's commitment towards pursuing a peaceful, negotiated political settlement in South Africa has made it possible for South Africa to take substantial steps towards lessening tensions in southern Africa. South Africa has implemented a number of far-reaching measures that clearly demonstrate its resolve to promote the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. South Africa desires the establishment in Africa of a zone free of nuclear weapons. This could, by extension, encompass a zone free of chemical and biological weapons. South Africa is ready to cooperate with like-minded States in the region and beyond, to achieve this objective. It has already shown its resolve in unilaterally taking substantial steps.

South Africa is aware of the relationship between global and regional disarmament and, while seeking to discharge its global disarmament obligations, will inevitably direct a significant portion of its contribution towards achieving peace, stability and socio-economic progress in southern Africa.

The South African Government acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 10 July 1991 and entered into a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency on 16 September 1991 in record time. Since its accession to the NPT, South Africa has cooperated fully with the IAEA and has strictly adhered to the conditions of the NPT. This policy of transparency and professional cooperation with the IAEA remains in force, as evidenced by the recent invitation by President F. W. de Klerk to the IAEA to undertake a further inspection visit to South Africa in connection with South Africa's past nuclear weapons programme.

On 24 March 1993, President de Klerk, before a joint session of Parliament, provided full information on that programme despite the fact that the NPT does not require this. The State President confirmed that South Africa had at one stage developed a limited nuclear deterrent capability but had subsequently dismantled and destroyed all the nuclear devices before acceding to the NPT. In his speech he emphasized the following:

> "South Africa's hands are clean and we are concealing nothing. Permission has now been granted by the Government, with a view to international inspection, for full access to facilities and records of facilities, which in the past were used for the preparation of a nuclear deterrent capability.
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> I sincerely trust that this unprecedented act, namely the voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information will confirm this Government's effort to assure transparency. I trust also that South Africa's initiative will inspire other countries to take the same steps."

In addition to South Africa's accession to the NPT, South Africa has also become a member of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA), an organization within the IAEA which coordinates peaceful, nuclear projects and cooperation between African States in the nuclear field. South Africa's advanced nuclear technology base and nuclear industry constitute an asset not only for South Africa but for our neighbouring States and Africa as a whole.

South Africa has set an example for the world in providing greater transparency in nuclear matters and believes that this example should be followed by other nuclear or potential nuclear States in the interest of world peace.

By signing the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on 14 January 1993, South Africa demonstrated further its commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament. At the time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, welcomed the enthusiastic support which this important multilateral agreement received from our fellow African countries and pledged South Africa's support for any initiatives aimed at making Africa the first continent to be declared free of all weapons of mass destruction.

South Africa seeks to promote peace and good-neighbourliness in southern Africa in the conviction that the military threat to the southern African region has abated. With the growing acceptance that the resort to armed force and violence is not the solution to regional problems, South Africa has been able to significantly reduce its military budget. South Africa associates itself with the international consensus that disarmament is a global priority area and contributes fundamentally to ensuring international peace and security. South Africa has therefore adopted a policy of directing its resources away from military expenditure towards far more pressing economic and social needs.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative